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Localisation in the 2004 Presidential
Election Campaign in Taiwan
An Iconographic Approach
Benson Wai Kwok Wong
1 This  article  uses  symbols,  colours,  gestures  or  slogans  photographed  during  the
electoral campaign in Taipei to present an iconographic review of the 2004 presidential
election in Taiwan.  Symbols,  as  Lowell  Dittmer has argued,  “exist  independently of
human  beings  and  may  transmit  meanings  from  person  to  person  despite  vast
distances of space and time”1. Symbols can actively promote political beliefs, ideas and/
or meanings in a covert or overt manner, and can be an important means by which to
understand political action and achieve political and cultural ends2. The functions of
symbols  include:  delivering  a  message  in  a  direct  and  forceful  way,  leaving  an
immediate and deep impression on the target group, encouraging the internalising of
perceptions, and influencing values, behaviour and decisions.
2 Inspired by Hans J. Morgenthau’s assertion of the relationship between propaganda and
diplomacy, we have, to a certain extent, applied this assertion to analyse the electoral
propaganda in the 2004 presidential election in Taiwan3. Propaganda is important in
helping  to  promote  and  reinforce  beliefs  by  challenging  ideas  and  currently  held
beliefs. It can even help to change beliefs. Propaganda creates, recreates, uses and can
cement convictions, values and preferences, in the aim of persuading people to share a
common goal  and interests.  Propaganda also  creates  icons  that  serve  as  a  political
identity for voters, as Murray Edelman argues, “[men] create political symbols and they
sustain and develop them or  wrap them”4.  The same assertion is  shared by Lowell
Dittmer, saying that “human communities do set forth comprehensible and relatively
consistent  rules  of  usage to  facilitate  speed and fidelity  of  communication”5.  Icons,
symbols and slogans provide the raw data for analysis and interpretation—an approach
useful in the study of both individual and collective behaviour.
Buttressing local identity
3 The  ways  in  which  the  contesting  parties  promoted  local  identity  throughout  the
election,  were useful in helping us to examine how they perceive and construct an
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image of Taiwan. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Taiwan Solidarity
Union (TSU) tend to present the island with a positive image. According to them, a
number  of  political  miracles  have  occurred  here,  most  notably  that  it  is  the  first
Chinese  society  where  full  democracy  can  be  practiced.  It  is  also  the  first  Chinese
society where the institutionalisation of power transfer through the election of the
national leader by universal suffrage can be achieved. It has also achieved a peaceful
end to authoritarian KMT rule and a beginning to localised rule by the DPP. 
 
1 Taiwan in lights – ceiling display at DPP election headquarters
4 Such positive images are seen in the first two photos—the first shows a number of eye-
catching green lights in the shape of the island of Taiwan and placed on the ceiling of
the DPP campaign headquarters. Taiwan is at the top, and everyone has to “look up to”
Taiwan. Additionally, since green is the colour of the DPP, the green lights imply that
Taiwan is under the protection of the DPP.
 
Localisation in the 2004 Presidential Election Campaign in Taiwan
China Perspectives, 55 | september - october 2004
2
2 With “Yes, Taiwan” on his cheek and “Yes, Taiwan” flag in hand, a young Taiwanese campaigns for
List No. 1 – Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu
5 Photo 2 shows the slogan “Yes! Taiwan” tattooed on the face of a youngster and also on
the flag in his hand. The exclamation mark after the “Yes” is in the shape of Taiwan.
The  Taiwanese  have  a  strong  determination  to  fulfil  their  aspirations:  besides
defending their island, the intend to follow through the reforms, as shown by the DPP
slogan (Photo 4): “Believing in Taiwan and persisting with reform” (xiangxin Taiwan,
jianchi gaige). 
6 The promotion of Chen Shui-bian as a local Taiwanese and a capable leader shows that
Taiwan, even if isolated, can stay standing in the international arena, and face internal
and  external  challenges,  including  the  threat  of  the  PRC.  Chen’s  emphasis  on
“localisation”  or  “Taiwanisation”  does  not  mean  however  that  the  KMT-PFP-NP
alliance is unaware of its importance. 
7 The KMT employed the term “New Taiwanese” (xin Taiwanren) to create a new image
that was a departure from the traditional image. James Soong first used the concept
when he ran for governor of  Taiwan in 1995,  and then Ma Ying-jeou used it  when
contesting the 1998 Taipei City mayoral race. However, the term could be interpreted
in  a  number  of  ways.  It  lacked  a  clear  message  and  depth  of  understanding,  and
criticism claimed that it  could be understood as “the division of Taiwanese old and
new.  James  Soong promotes  the  independence  of  Taiwan in  a  covert  manner”6.  To
portray a KMT rooted in Taiwan, its election campaign would not heavily emphasise
unification as this would imply that Taiwan would be merged with mainland China, and
the possibility of the island losing its autonomy. Of course, the KMT is striving to re-
establish its image as a local political force by accepting that most of the forums were
conducted in a bilingual format—Taiwanese (taiyu) and Mandarin—so as to soften the
image of “Waishengren” (people from mainland China). 
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3 KMT Chairman Lien Chan (centre), wife Lien Fang Yu, and party secretary-general Lin Feng-cheng,
kiss the ground at a election rally in Taipei, 13 March 2004
Source: Taipei Times, 14 March 2004
8 During the campaign rallies for the 2004 presidential election, the KMT-PFP political
alliance attempted to go beyond the concept of the “New Taiwanese”, and to a certain
extent followed a similar strategy adopted by the DPP to promote “Taiwan’s identity”,
stressing their love for Taiwan and recognising that they are a part of Taiwan. Photo 3
shows Lien Chan, chairman of the KMT, with his wife and the secretary-general of the
Nationalist  party,  kissing  the  land  to  show  their  love  for  the  island.  The  KMT  is
determined to reconstruct itself and its image: no longer an alien political party that
came from mainland China in 1949, but a localised political party rooted in Taiwan and
working for Taiwanese. Taiwanisation became a key element of the campaigning during
this presidential election in order to win the hearts and minds of voters. 
Taiwan’s capacity to face political challenges
9 The Taiwanese are proud that  their  island is  the first  Chinese society to  enjoy full
democracy.  Chen  Shui-bian,  in  his  first  inaugural  speech,  given  on  May  20th,
emphasised Taiwan’s political achievement of becoming a model of democracy not only
for Chinese society, but for the wider Asian society also. He declared that: “On the eve
of the twenty-first century, the people of Taiwan have completed a historic alternation
of  political  parties  in  power.  This  is  not  the  first  of  its  kind  in  the  history  of  the
Republic of China, but also an epochal landmark for Chinese communities around the
world. Taiwan has not only set the new model for the Asian experience of democracy,
but also added an inspiring example to the third wave of democracy the world over. […]
Today, it is as if we are standing before a fresh new gate in history. In the process of
democratisation, the Taiwanese people have created a brand-new key to our shared
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destiny. The new century’s gates of hope are soon to open. We are humble but not
submissive. We are full of self-confidence but not the slightest bit of self-satisfaction”  7. 
10 A  similar  message  was  conveyed  in  his  inaugural  speech  in  2004,  emphasising  the
successful democratic experience of Taiwan under his governance over the past four
years: “What we have come together to witness are the progressive steps of Taiwan’s
democracy, as well as a story, written jointly by the 23 million people of Taiwan—one
that  is  extraordinary  and  truly  remarkable.  […]  In  the  final  year  of  the  twentieth
century, Taiwan crossed a historic doorsill, completing an unprecedented transfer of
power between political parties, and ushering in a new era in our nation’s democratic
development.  [….]  In  the  eyes  of  Chinese  societies  and  other  emerging  democratic
states,  Taiwan’s  democracy  embodies  not  merely  a  democratic  experimentation;  it
signifies  an  exemplary  success.  The  standard  of  democracy  achieved  by  Western
nations is the result of experience through the test of time. In comparison, Taiwan’s
newfound democracy, after weathering rough waters, has burgeoned into an even more
precious accomplishment”8.
 
4 Slogans at DPP headquarters. “Believe in Taiwan”, “Push ahead with reforms”
11 Chen reiterated several political challenges faced by the Taiwanese in the process of
democratisation, notably the transfer of power from an old ruling regime to a new
party, and the setting up of a new mode of democracy for a Chinese society. Photos 4
and 5 illustrate the determination of Taiwanese political parties to win through the
political challenges facing them. In photo 4, the DPP claims: “Believing in Taiwan and
persisting with reform”, “With achievement and self-confidence, we have the power”,
and “Taiwan No. 1 and Reform No. 1”. On photo 5, the figure “100” can be interpreted
in three ways:  100 is  full  marks in the Taiwanese education system, so Taiwan can
achieve the best possible result in the democratic transition; “1” in the 100 is an appeal
to the voters to cast a vote for the ticket “1”, the ticket of Chen Shui-bian and Annette
Lu; the design inside the two “0”s is the stamp that voters mark on the ballot: it is
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inspired by and adapted from the symbol for peace, meaning that voters should also
participate  in  the  referendum  to  uphold  peace  in  the  cross-Strait  region9.  Thus,
according to the DPP’s  election campaign political  challenges such as  undergoing a
smooth transfer of power, upholding the reforms, and holding a referendum for the
maintaining of peace and order in Taiwan, could be won with the support of the people.
 
5 DPP election poster: “Referendum, First Priority” and “Taiwan 100” [out of 100]
12 The KMT-PFP alliance had a different view of Taiwan’s present landscape, advocating
that Taiwan’s crisis is due to Chen’s inefficient administration and his confrontational
approach to the opposition. The alliance’s message was clear: that the only way to save
Taiwan from further decline and decay was to vote for them to effect a second round of
power transfer from the DPP to the KMT-PFP alliance. The major theme of the election
campaign run by the KMT was to “strive for the economy and strive for peace, save
Taiwan”, as can be seen in photo 6,  taken inside the campaign headquarters of the
KMT. In short, Taiwan must revitalise its economy by reconstructing and maintaining
harmonious and co-operative relations with mainland China. 
 
6 At KMT election headquarters. List No. 2, “Fight for the economy, Give our all for Peace, Save
Taiwan”
13 Both groups took Taiwan’s identity as the major theme of their campaign rallies, yet
with a very different view of the local situation. While the DPP adopted a positive stand,
saying  that  Taiwan  could  overcome  any  difficulties  and  insisting  on  the  unique
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character of the island, which it would bring to the political situation, the KMT-PFP
alliance held that Taiwan was facing economic crisis, political disturbance, and tense
relations with the PRC, suggesting it was time for the Taiwanese to effect a further
transfer of power.
Chen Shui-bian as the “symbol of Taiwan”
14 In his promotion of the DPP, Chen Shui-bian has succeeded in constructing an image of
himself as the “symbol of Taiwan”, importantly in this that he was born in Taiwan, not
on  the  mainland,  that  he  struggled  for  democracy  and  freedoms  against  the
authoritarian regime of the KMT in the late 1980s, that he has adopted a tough stance
towards the PRC to portray himself  as  “defender” of  the island and its  people and





15 He developed these images of himself during the campaign rallies, first as a reformer
leading Taiwan down the road of reforms (photo 4, he is on a bicycle leading the other
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cyclists). Water also symbolises Chen since shui, the first character of his given name,
means “water”. The running water pouring from the taps in photos 7 and 8 signifies a
continuation of the reforms in his second term and that prosperity will be sustained.
Finally,  unlikely  most  political  leaders  who  portray  themselves  as  charismatic  and
charming, Chen adopts a more casual approach portraying himself as an energetic and
friendly role model in order to attract younger voters. Photos 9 and 10 depict Chen and
Lu in a comical way, making them accessible to the young generation. Lien Chan has
also adopted this strategy (Photo 11). 
 
9 The A-Bian family
 
10 Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu
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11 Lien Chan
16 Chen calculated that the youth vote accounted for a large proportion of the voting
population. He therefore adopted a more casual approach to win their support. The
creation of the “A-bian” family (Photo 9) was part of this strategy as was its design as,
while it also operated like, a fan club. This was intended to mobilise supporters and
voluntary workers (zhigong) in the campaign rallies. 
17 Lien  Chan  and  James  Soong  seemed  to  prefer  to  retain  their  charismatic  image,
focusing on public speeches to appeal directly to their audiences. 
The hostility towards the PRC
18 This assertion will be examined in two ways: the rejection of the PRC’s “one China”
principle and “One Country Two Systems” as the proposed future path for Taiwan; the
abhorrence  of  and the  resistance  towards  the  PRC’s  negative  remarks  and military
threats. 
19 Following the same strategy adopted in the 2000 presidential election, the KMT did not
strongly advocate a “one China” policy.  Both candidates said the Republic of  China
(ROC) was an independent sovereign state11. Lien Chan strongly asserted that “Macau
was a colony, so was Hong Kong, but we are not. The Republic of China has been a
sovereign  state  since  its  founding  in  1912.  We  would  become  citizens  of  a  colony
according  to  the  way  they  treat  us.  Isn’t  that  ridiculous?”12.  According  to  a  public
opinion  survey  jointly  conducted  by  the  Mainland  Affairs  Council  (MAC)  and  the
Elections Study Centre of National Chengchi University between April 23rd and 25th
2004, 80.8% of the respondents disapproved of the adoption of the “one country two
systems” formula and of accepting Taiwan as a local government of the PRC, stating
that the Taiwanese people “overwhelmingly regard themselves as a sovereign nation
on an equal footing with China”13.
20 Considering these circumstances, the Taipei government could have solid justification
for rejecting the national unification proposal, notably the “one country two systems”
approach14. This observation, in turn, is supported by the defeat of the same political
experiment currently practiced in Hong Kong (in particular by the rejection of  the
weak and docile  Chief  Executive  and his  ruling clique  as  defenders  of  the  political
interests  of  the Hong  Kong  people,  the  presence  of  pro-government  social  and
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economic elites that serve as mouthpieces for central government in Peking, and the
PRC’s intervention in the administration of Special Administrative Region, etc.). This
situation has led to a determination among the Taiwanese that Taiwan will not and
shall  not  be  a  second  Hong  Kong.  Chen  Shui-bian  has  claimed  that  “many  of  our
citizens have told me that we have made enough concessions and shown our sincerity
to the fullest, yet we have received little positive response from the Chinese mainland.
They told me not to make any more concessions”15.
21 The Peking authorities still adopt a tough policy towards the Taiwanese, and threats of
military  action  if  “Taiwan  independence”  is  pursued.  During  the  2000  presidential
election, the People’s Liberation Army Daily asserted “Taiwan independence means war”,
and  accused  the  United  States  of  lending  “hegemonic  support”  to  Taiwan’s
independence so that the island could be used as a base to contain China16. Zhu Rongji,
the former Prime Minister of the People’s Republic said that if Taiwan voters elected
the wrong candidate, they might not be given another chance17. Worse still, the PRC
government  profoundly  devalues  political  developments  towards  independence  in
Taiwan,  asserting that:  “Judging from the extreme views on ‘Taiwan independence’
advocated by Chen Shui-bian, ‘Taiwan independence’ is the key factor that would lead
to worsening cross-Strait relations and instability across the Taiwan Strait. Chen uses
‘democracy’  to  promote  ‘independence’.  He  tries  to  make  false  promises  to  the
Taiwanese people, distorts public opinion, and uses ‘independence’ to undermine the
interests of the Taiwanese. His one-party and one-person rule cannot be fulfilled in this
regard”18. 
22 An identical position was taken in the 2004 presidential election: “We understand and
respect the Taiwan compatriots’ desire for developing democracy, but we firmly oppose
the Taiwan authorities’  pursuit of ‘Taiwan independence’ and any splittist  activities
under the cloak of democracy”19. After Chen made his inaugural speech on May 20th
2004, the Peking authorities insisted on such tough remarks against Chen, saying that:
“Chen Shui-bian, who attempted to cheat the public in his ‘inauguration speech’ on
May 20th,  still  sticks  to  his  ‘Taiwan independence’  stance.  As  such the  cross-Strait
situation remains severe”20.
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12 A DPP election poster: “The National Assembly shows the way”, “Referendum – 20 March”,
“Greens set for landslide victory”, “The Master of the Nation is impressive”, “ Blues Out, with the
Reds”, “Missiles”, “28 February hand in hand”
23 As a result, this deep misunderstanding and insistent and inflexible approach on the
part  of  the  PRC  towards  Taiwan’s  political  developments  has  ultimately  led  to  a
hostility among Taiwanese towards the PRC. Focusing on the DPP’s election campaign,
photo 12 shows a cartoon portraying the negative Taiwanese perception of the PRC.
The  cartoon  shows  an  image  of  a  Taiwanese  people  bravely  standing  up  to  its
neighbour. Taiwan is coloured green with Chen Shui-bian depicted as a tiger proudly
facing  the  mainland.  A  number  of  people  also  coloured  green  stand  hand-in-hand
facing  the  mainland,  showing,  through  the  use  of  the  word  “missiles”  (feidan)  on
Taiwan’s  side,  a  united  Taiwanese  people  undaunted  by  the  mainland’s  military
threats21. The PRC is portrayed as a cunning fox facing Taiwan, its jaws open, showing
its intention. The KMT, the PFP and the New Party are placed between mainland China
and Taiwan, thus “marginalised”. The cartoon strongly implies that the PRC and KMT
share a common feature, that both are aliens in the eyes of the DPP. The message is
clear. In order not to allow a repetition of the agony and horror of Chiang Kai-shek’s
rule, the Taiwanese must do their utmost to dispel the PRC’s threat22. 
24 The KMT-PFP alliance approach towards the PRC is in stark contrast. Conciliatory in
nature, it focuses instead on the view that communication between the mainland and
Taiwan should be resumed for the benefit of Taiwan. Photo 13 shows Lien and Soong
advocating the establishment of direct flights between the island and the mainland for
the benefit of Taiwanese businessmen working in mainland China, thus expressing a
willingness to maintain and strengthen economic and cultural ties. 
25 Underlying  these  differing  approaches  are  the  very  different  perception  that  each
group has  of  the  PRC.  While  the DPP tends to  maintain a  defensive  position in  its
relations with the mainland, seeing it as a threat, the KMT-PFP alliance do not overlook
the  importance  of  the  role  that  the  mainland  has  in  stabilising  Taiwan’s  political
situation and the importance of maintaining peaceful relations with its neighbour as a
great asset to the Taiwanese while still espousing Taiwan’s sovereignty.
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13 KMT poster: “Daddy will be home for supper – direct flights within two years”, “A-Bian can’t do it
– Lien and Soong promise they will”
26 Despite the fact that the data we have chosen to use here is limited to Taipei city, the
study  is  meaningful  in  showing  how  Taiwan  identity  was  expressed  during  the
presidential  election.  An  analysis  of  the  overt  and  underlying  meanings  of  icons,
symbols and slogans led us to three conclusions:
27 “Localisation” or “Taiwanisation” is an inevitable trend in the sense that the Taiwanese
virtually regard Taiwan as a de facto nation; yet while they choose to recognise this,
they  also  choose  not  to  voice  this  formally  to  avoid  antagonising  the  mainland
authorities. This is reflected in the relatively low vote of 45% for a referendum. 
28 The KMT is no longer a political party hailing from the mainland; instead it has become
a local party with public recognition, especially in southern Taiwan, reflected in the use
of  the  “Taiwanese  language”  during  rallies  to  construct  an  image  of  a  friendly,
understanding and approachable party, important as southern Taiwan is not a KMT
power base. This trend, to a certain extent, shows that campaign strategies are inspired
by the popularity of the DPP, and thus that localisation is the only effective way of
gaining public recognition and support. 
29 Finally,  the trend towards localisation poses the PRC authorities with a dilemma. If
Peking adopts a hard-line policy towards the Taipei government, this unintentionally
stimulates Taiwanisation since most Taiwanese regard the government in Peking as an
unfriendly and ambitious neighbour eager to annex Taiwan for complete unification.
On the other hand, if Peking recognises the growth and development of Taiwanisation,
it may imply “toleration” on the part of the PRC authorities of Taiwan independence.
This would be an illusion.
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RÉSUMÉS
The 2004 presidential election campaign in Taiwan brought head to head the political alliance of
the Kuomintang (KMT), the People’s First Party (PFP) and the New Party (NP) on one side, and of
the Democracy Progressive Party (DPP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) on the other.
Adopting  an  iconographic  approach,  this  article  looks  at  four  aspects  of  “Taiwanisation”:  a
stronger  Taiwan  identity,  the  island’s  ability  to  face  political  challenges  arising  from
democratisation and political unrest, Chen Shui-bian as the symbol of Taiwan, and the Taiwanese
hostility towards and distrust of mainland China. 
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